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Every developmental psychologist knows it, many developmental psychol-
ogists have explicitly said it over the years, but only a few researchers have paid 
attention to this fact in their own work: most of our theories of developmental 
change are not based on empirical study of these changes, but rather on 
inferences derived from studies of developmental differences between groups of 
subjects of different ages. lt is well known that more than 90% of published data 
arise from cross-sectional studies; in contrast, the results from longitudinal 
studies play only a secondary role. 
Why is developmental research so strongly dominated by cross-sectional 
designs? Three advantages of these designs come first to mind. 
The first advantage is a pragmatic one. Modern science is in some ways like a 
factory for the fast and efficient production of the most data possible. Cross-
sectional studies offer a very effective medium for fulfilling this requirement. All 
one needs for a fair chance of getting successful results is a good idea about 
possible developmental changes or age differences, two, three or four samples 
from different age groups and a relatively uncomplicated and reliable measure-
ment that avoids floor and ceiling effects. lt is only reasonable to expect that 
some of the many variables measured in childhood will increase with age, that 
no interesting age differences will be apparent in early and middle adulthood, 
and that mean decreases in cognitive competence, and increases in behavioural 
problems, occur in old age. Of course, the characteiization of cross-sectional 
designs as just a vehicle for allowing more and more developmental psychol-
ogists to publish more and more articles is too simplistic and biased an 
evaluation. 
The second advantage of cross-sectional designsisthat they can characterize 
and describe typical characteristics across different ages very weil. Behavioural 
and mental changes that are otherwise difficult to describe, and often only 
moderately correlated with age become, through age-group comparisons, very 
concise and clear contrastive developmental differences. However, the validity 
of taking mean age differences as an indicator of individual change is generally 
an untested presumption that is reasonable only when it applies to universal 
developmental phenomena that apply to (nearly) all members of our species. 
This brings us to the third advantage of cross-sectional designs: they fit into a 
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methodological framework arising from a theoretical perspective in which 
development is conceived as species-specific, universal, and unavoidable. Many 
developmental phenomena, at least in early childhood and old age, obey such 
biological rules and constraints or follow a (psycho-)logical sequence. 
A characterization of the advantages of cross-sectional designsalso implicitly 
refers to their Iimits and disadvantages. Assuming that research has the goal of 
providing scientifically appropriate descriptions, explanations and predictions 
of cognitive, social and emotional development, there are five problern areas 
where no satisfactory solution is possible without longitudinal data. 
(a) Current developmentallaws are not based on data aggregated over 
changes within individuals, but rather on inferences from mean, 
variance, and covariance data from two or more age groups. As a 
consequence, those phenomena for which the detection of develop-
mental change on the basis of mean age differences is not possible or 
not reliable will be overlooked or misinterpreted. One typical example 
for this is that underlying the linear increase of average memory 
performances there are enormous intra- and inter-individual differ-
ences in the development of memoryskillsthat were ignored for over a 
century (Weinert, 1991). 
(b) Both the overemphasis on universal development and the resulting 
cross-sectional methodology reinforce the tendency to reduce the 
definition and analysis of interindividual differences to acceleration or 
retardation in the pace of development within a universal, age-related 
developmental sequence. This means that qualitative differences in 
developmental change are generallynot taken into account, and, more 
importantly, it is not even possible to test whether there arequalitative 
differences in patteras of change at all. This is weil illustrated by the 
many studies and debates about possible qualitative developmental 
differences among normal, disabled and gifted children (Weisz & 
Y eates, 1981; Weiss, Weisz & Bromfield, 1986; Weinert & Waldmann, 
1986). 
(c) The third problern area isthat cross-sectional designs tend to promote 
psychological theories of development that are variable- rather than 
person-centred, because changes in the intra-individual structure or 
pattera of variables cannot be assessed. Any person-centred claims 
made on the basis of cross-sectional data are usually empirically 
untested inferences from the patteras of correlations between indepen-
dent samples. To illustrate: a focus on variable-centred theories has, no 
doubt, contributed to the fact that personality development is des-
cribed either in terms of cognitive models that assume a universal 
developmental course, or as the sum of changes in single characteris-
tics, such as anxiety, shyness and the like. 
(d) We Iack theoretical models and empirical studies that address them-
selves to predicting individual developmental sequences. This is not 
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just a problern directed to academic research: it also severely hinders 
the application of results from developmental research (Kohlberg, 
LaCrosse & Ricks, 1972). 
(e) A Iack of models conceming change at tbe individuallevel applies not 
just to predictions but also to explanations of developmental change. 
For example, socialization research has been separate from mainstream 
developmental research for some time, because of its focus on 
socialization conditions as tbe explanatory basis for inter- and intra-
individual variance in the development of psychological characteris-
tics. Of course, the extent of this variance is largely unknown, because 
there is a Iack of empirically grounded models for the description of 
intra- and inter-individual developmental variance (Weinert, 1990). 
Enough of the familiar complaints about the limitations of cross-sectional 
designs. Longitudinal researchers are inclined to think that tbeir methodologi-
cal approach can make a great contribution to developmental psychology. 
Longitudinal studies, however, at least with the current methodology, can not 
quickly and satisfactorily solve all of the obvious theoretical problems either. 
To achieve this, we still need to do a great deal ofwork. We will argue, though, 
that this work will pa y off. We will address this claim in the rest of tbe chapter, 
addressing four points. 
TYPES OF LONGITUDINAL ASSESSMENTS OF 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A general problern with evaluating the relevance of longitudinal studies for the 
description and explanation of human development concerns the definition of 
what is considered as 'longitudinal'. This term does not describe a single 
method but a !arge variety of methods. The spectrum of methods ranges from 
single-case studies in time-series arrangements to broad-band panel designs 
including many measurement points and thousands of subjects. The only 
common denominator of longitudinal research is variation of time and repeated 
observation of a given entity ( cf. Baltes & Nesselroade, 1979). 
Given the Iack of definitional clarity, it makes sense to distinguish among 
different types of longitudinal approaches that seem to follow different goals. 
There is a general agreement in the developmentalliterature that two basic types 
oflongitudinal inquiry can be differentiated. One type concerns what Wohlwill 
(1973) called the 'developmental function', that is, changes in tbe average andfor 
individual value of a dependent variable over time. The second type of 
longitudinal inquiry concems the issue of individual differences. Here, the 
major issue is how stable or unstable individual differences remain over time. 
It is important to note tbat the issue of stability or instability of individual 
differences over time is conceptually independent from the issue of continuity or 
discontinuity in the developing psychological entity. A continuous develop-
mental function for an entire sample might still occur despite significant 
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instability in individual differences. Whether the two are related or not is always 
an empirical question ( cf. Appelbaum & McCall, 1983). Longitudinal 
researchers have often overlooked the fact that the continuity of a developmen-
tal function and the stability of individual differences over time represent two 
separate aspects of the sameproblern (see for a more systematic treatment of this 
topic Asendorpf 1992a; Schneider, 1989). 
How can we relate the existing types of longitudinal studies to these two 
aspects of inquiry? A review of longitudinal studies (Schneider & Edelstein, 
1990; Verdonik & Sherrod, 1984) reveals that the majority of studies focus on 
the stability issue. That is, thesesturlies concentrate on the question of whether 
individual subjects maintain appro:ximately the same relative rank ordering 
within their group over time. Differences among studies of this type concem 
how the stability concept is treated: whereas some researchers differentiate 
between the stability of a variable and the stability of an individual (Wohl will, 
1973), others deline stability of the individual as ipsative stability, that is, the 
persistence of a pattem of variables for an individual subject over time (cf. 
Asendorpf & Weinert, 1990; Asendorpf & van Aken, 1991; Rutter, 1987). 
In a few longitudinal studies the second aspect oflongitudinal inquiry, that is, 
the issue of continuityfdiscontinuity of development has been investigated. 
Here, the major difficulty is that the same instruments must be used on each 
testing occasion, and one must be able to prove that the instruments do not 
change their meaning over time (cf. Kagan, 1980; Magnusson, 1981). Asen-
dorpf (1992a) has recently suggested a methodology for studying this problern 
empirically. Other approaches include (nomothetical) single-case studies, inves-
tigating the growth of a specific psychological function over an extended period 
in time; and so-called 'rnicro-genetic' longitudinal studies, based on a few 
subjects and focusing on quantitative as weil as qualitative changes in a specific 
developmental area (for a more systematic characterization of this treatment and 
for some illustrative examples, see Siegier & Jenkins, 1989; Siegier & Crowley, 
1991). 
WHAT KIND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
DOES LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH GENERA TE? 
What is the 'new' knowledge that longitudinal sturlies can add to that already 
acquired through cross-sectional research? As emphasized by Baltes and 
Nesselroade (1979), longitudinal research can improve our understanding of 
developmental processes because it is particularly suited to describe and explain 
individual development in several aspects: (a) intraindividual change can be 
directly identified; (b) causes of intra-individual change can be analysed; (c) 
inter-individual differences in intra-individual change can be directly identified; 
( d) possible causes of inter-individual differences in intra-individual change can 
be analysed, and (e) interrelationships among classes of behaviour and their 
common patteras of change can be assessed. Another advantage of longitudinal 
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sturlies over cross-sectional designs is that individual differences in one domain 
can be predicted from individual differences in another domain. For example, 
with longitudinal designs one can explore the impact of early risk factors like 
delay in language acquisition ( domain 1) on later reading and writing skills 
(domain 2). 
In our view, it is questionable whether large-scale, broad-band longitudinal 
analyses can provide new information on general or universal developmental 
trends. The same results could probably be obtained via cross-sectional sturlies 
(for specific problems see Schaie, 1989). Accordingly, the costs oflongitudinal 
research may appear too great for researchers predominantly interested in the 
exploration of universal developmental trends ( cf. De Ribaupierre, 1989). 
However, there is no doubt that the longitudinal approach is the only suitable 
method for investigating individual differences and their stability over time. 
That is, longitudinal research must be used to assess whether development takes 
the same form for all individuals. As already mentioned above, the issue of the 
continuityfdiscontinuity of development is conceptually unrelated to the issue 
of stability Iinstability of individual differences. The relationship between these 
two aspects of development can only be tested empirically: although it could be 
that a continuous developmental function (e.g. a linear increase in competence 
over time) is accompanied by stable inter-individual differences over time, this 
need not be the case. The exact nature of this relationship can only be assessed 
via longitudinal designs. 
Another advantage of the longitudinal sturlies is that the single-case and 
rnicrogenetic sturlies mentioned above provide tools for investigating the issue 
of identification of intra-individual change in specific psychological functions. 
When planned carefully, such sturlies give important information on the typical 
developmental course of a psychological function that is based on growth curve 
patterns aggregated across several individuals. Statistical models (growth curve 
models) that suggest the type of the developmental function in question (e.g. 
linear versus nonlinear), and that are helpful in identifying underlying causes of 
individual differences in intra-individual change can be used with these data (see 
Bryck & Raudenbush, 1987). Information of this kind cannot be obtained 
through cross-sectional analyses. 
Fine-grained longitudinal analyses of this type are generally restricted to 
small-scale, short time-span investigations. Microgenetic sturlies arenot feasible 
over a long time period or with many subjects. 
A final important advantage of longitudinal designs is that they allow the 
estimation and testing of developmental models. Usually, predictionsfhypo-
theses concerning stability and change in patterns of variables are derived from 
cross-sectional research and tested through longitudinal assessments. The 
importance of this approach for the acquisition of new knowledge about long-
term developmental trends has been demonstrated in many cognitive and social 
domains ( cf. Magnusson, 1988). 
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EXAMPLES OF LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH ON 
COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT BASEDON 
LONGITUDINAL DATA 
In the following, we will discuss a few selected examples that we think show 
how longitudinal research has enriched our knowledge of developmental 
processes. 
Consistency and stability of memory development in early 
childhood 
The first example concems the development of cognitive processes and is taken 
from the longitudinal study on the genesis of individual competencies (LOGIC) 
which has been conducted at our institute (cf. Weinert & Schneider, 1989). The 
study Started in 1984 with about 200 4-year-old children who have been 
followed annually. From the very beginning, children were tested with a broad 
range of measures assessing cognitive skills like intelligence, memory, and 
problern solving, motivational tendencies, and social-emotional constructs like 
social inhibition or social competence in various settings. 
One question concemed the development of memory in children. At the first 
measurement point, memory span, performance in a sort-recall task and 
memory for scripted texts (e.g. a birthday party, playing with friends) were 
assessed. When inter-correlations among these memory measures were com-
puted for this first measurement point ( see Table 5.1 ), it was found that, with the 
exception of the inter-relationship between recall for the two stories, intertask 
consistency in pre-schooler's memory performance was remarkably low (cf. 
Weinert, Schneider & Knopf, 1988). 
Table 5.1. Intercorrelations among various memory performance 
measures obtained for four-year-old children ( N = 185) 
Variables 
1. Memory span 
2. Recall in a sort-recall task 
3. Text recall 1 (birtbday party) 
4. Text recall 2 (playing with friends) 
Source: Data from Weinert et al. 1988, p.59. 
(2) 
.21 
(3) 
.20 
.23 
(4) 
.25 
.36 
.64 
Over the subsequent pre-school and kindergatten years, the same measures 
were repeated at least twice. An inspection of the means and standard deviations 
suggested an approximately linear increase in performance for most memory 
measures. However, the analysis of synchronic ( cross-sectional) and diachronic 
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Fig. 5.1. Scatterplot of the bivariate distribution of children's individual stabilities in free recall and their initial scores in this variable. 
(Data from Schneider & Sodian, 1991, p.23.) NoteNumbers displayed oo scatterplot indicate oumber of observations at each position. 
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(across-measurement points) correlations revealed different patterns of stability 
for the memory span and sott-recall variables on the one hand, and the text 
recall variables on the other. Whereas neither the synchronic nor the diachronic 
correlations among the memory span and sort-recall variables were substantial 
(rs < .40), the synchronic as well as diachronic correlations for the text recall 
variables ranged between .40 and .60, indicating fairly respectable interrelation-
ships (cf. Schneider, Knopf & Weinett, 1989). 
In a recent reanalysis of some of these results (Schneider & Sodian, 1991 ), we 
looked at possible reasons for the overalllow group stability (r= .38) found for 
the sort-recall data over a two-year time interval. Computations of individual 
stabilities (see Asendorpf, 1989a, 1990c) revealed considerable inconsistency in 
individuals' standing relative to the reference group. In addition, the stability of 
children's recall from 4 to 6 years was positively related to the amount of recall at 
age 4. This is illustrated by the scatterplot of the correlation of .24 between the 
(transformed) individual stabilities and free recall at the first measurement point 
at 4 years. Fig. 5.1 shows that individual stabilities tended tobe particularly low 
for those children scoring low at the first measurement point. On the other 
hand, most children scoring above the sample mean at time 1 demonstrated 
relatively good stability over time. 
As a next step, sub-group analyses on children with high versus low scores at 
4 years were conducted. Most of the subjects who scored low at 4 years at least 
doubled their recall by 6 years. Although this could be due to true developmen-
tal change in these children's mnemonic skills, an alternative explanationisthat 
we did not assess these children's true competence at 4 years. Because we also 
found highly inconsistent results when comparing these children's text recall on 
the two similar stories presented at 4 years, we are inclined to believe that the 
instability over time observed for this sub-group of children should be 
interpreted more as stemrning from measurement problems in assessing true 
competence than as fl.uctuations in rates of true developmental change. 
As we suspected, the small group of unstable children was mainly responsible 
for the low overall group stability observed for the sort-recall data. Excluding 
these 24 subjects from the sample of almost 200 children raised group stability 
from .36 to .65. 
To explore the reasons for the difficulties with assessing these subjects' true 
competencies at the very beginning of our longitudinal study, we carried the 
analyses one step further. We found that the majority of these children were also 
classified as very shy at the first measurement point, as indicated by a variety of 
shyness assessments (Asendorpf, 1990a). One possible explanation for the poor 
performance of these children at the very first measurement pointisthat they feit 
particularly uncomfortable with unfamiliar experimenters in a new situation. 
Taken together, then, these results illustrate the contribution of longitudinal 
studies in understanding early cognitive development. Because they allow in-
depth analyses of individual and differential stabilities of performance over time, 
they can provide us with a comprehensive picture of inter-individual differences 
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in developmental change, thereby going beyond the information obtained from 
cross-sectional studies. 
ST ABILITIES, OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMIT ATIONS 
OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ADUL THOOD 
AND OLD AGE 
lt is well known that the results from cross-sectional studies in the first decades 
of this century helped support a generally accepted deficit model of cognitive 
aging. More recent research in this area can be described as a successful effort to 
overcome this stereotype. In this effort, different sorts of longitudinal studies 
have played an important role. 
Convincing evidence for a 'new look' in research on adult intelligence within 
the psychometric paradigm comes from two conclusions from the results of the 
Seattle Longitudinal Study (Schaie, 1983). In this study, subjects between 25 
and 81 years of age were tested regularly every seven years on intelligence tests 
that were constructed according to the construct of primary mental abilities. 
The two conclusions were: 
• A considerable portion of age-typical decreases in intellectual achieve-
ment found in cross-sectional studies is not an effect of aging, but of 
cohort group. What this means is that differences in the acquisition of 
cognitive competence result from differences in the culture, school, 
and work-related leaming opportunities available to people in differ-
ent generations. Indeed, on the basis of changes in these opportunities, 
Schaie expected that in the future 'the large ability differences between 
young and old adults that are observed currently will be much 
reduced' (1990, p. 299). 
• Changes in performance competence in adulthood may be due to 
individual differences in experience even more than to cohort differ-
ences. For example, among the 60 year-olds in the Seattle Longitudinal 
Study, 75% of the participants maintained their performance level for 
at least four out of five of the primary abilities tested 7 years later, as did 
more than half of the 80 year-olds. From this result Schaie concluded 
'that rates of change in cognitive behavior is a highly individuated 
phenomenon' (1989, p. 84). 
The data from studies using an information processing paradigm support and 
strengthen the role of individual differences in cognitive aging suggested by 
psychometrically oriented longitudinal studies. This approach assumes that the 
solution of demanding tasks and problems depends less on general intelleemal 
abilities than on the quantity and quality of content-specific declarative and 
procedural knowledge. Indeed, in their modification of a conclusion made 
famous by Flavell, Hatano and Inagaki wrote: 'What develops? It is domain 
specific knowledge that develops" (1986, p. 267). 
It is often assumed that the exclusive importance of domain specific 
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knowledge is confirmed by studies comparing novices and experts. Many 
cognitive psychologists interpret novice-expert performance differences 
(where subjects are equated for IQ, memory span and education) exclusively as a 
consequence of the experts' increased and different content-specific knowledge 
within a particular domain (e.g. chess, physics, radiology). This explanation, 
however, is not accurate, because interpreting results from such contrastive 
studies runs into the same problems as interpreting results from cross-sectional 
studies. Specifically, it is not clear whether differences between novices and 
experts are valid indices for individual processes of change. In fact, it is quite 
likely that group differences between novices and experts arise because some 
proportion of novices drop out during the long process of acquiring expertise, 
perhaps because the cognitive demands are too hard, or because the long term 
motivation is missing. Thus, novices and experts may differ in more than just the 
possession of rich domain specific knowledge. Thus, to explain the inRuence of 
knowledge acquisition on changes in cognitive performance at an individual 
Ievel, longitudinal studies are necessary. Different sorts oflongitudinal method-
ologies can be useful in this context. 
First of all, there are quasi-longitudinal designs, in which pre-experimental 
knowledge is carefully analysed. In this case, both the intra-individual know-
ledge profile and inter-individual differences in knowledge are predicted to play 
an important role. Not only will meaningful individual differences in the 
solution of cognitive tasks depend on how comprehensive domain specific 
expertise is but an individual's performance Ievel will remain more stable with 
increasing age when an elaborated knowledge base can be used. This hypothesis 
has generally been confirmed in empirical studies (Knopf, Kolodziej & 
Preussler, 1990). It is both theoretically and pragmatically interesting that such 
expert skills can help compensate for age-related deficits in basic cognitive 
functions in the production of more complex outcomes (Salthouse, 1984). 
A second longitudinal procedure is to provide systematic and controlled 
training in a specific expertise. Because of the enormous amount of effort 
required, this is usually realized in a single subjects design. A good example of 
such a design is a study by Staszewski (1990), who tumed a single subject into a 
digit span memory expert by systematically training him for more than five 
years. Beginning with an average span of 8 digits, the subject finally achieved a 
span of 104 numbers, correctly repeated after a single presentation. Even more 
interesting than this incredible achievement, is the theoretically oriented study 
of the memory skills that the subject acquired from a mixture of practice, 
knowledge and strategies. 
An example of a third variation of longitudinal designs shows how the results 
of such single case studies can be generalized to all age-groups. This example is 
of testing-the-limits experiments with unselected samples of different ages 
(Kliegl, Smith & Baltes, 1989). The experiments were concemed with extend-
ing word span through combining and automatizing different mnemonic 
techniques. 
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Fig. 5.2 shows that young and old adults showed equivalently large training 
effects and both achieved a criterion of outstanding performance. None the less, 
dear age differences in the extent to which maximum performance could be 
achieved were apparent, so that improvements in memory performance at the 
end of training by young and old subjects equated for IQ no Ionger overlapped. 
This pattero of results provides good evidence both for the possibility of age-
independent improvement in memory performance as a consequence of 
acquiring expertise, and also for age-dependent limitations in the learning skills 
necessary for acquiring expertise. As Fig. 5.2 also makes dear, individual 
differences in these age-related limitations were also quite large. 
If one summarizes the findings from the longitudinal studies on cognitive 
aging mentioned here as well as many others, some general condusions about 
the meaning of individual differences for cognitive development in adulthood 
are possible. 
• There are age-invariant individual differences in the cognitive poten-
tial to acquire new cognitive competencies. 
• There are individual differences in domain speci6c zones of proximal 
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change that seem to depend on general intelleemal resources as well as 
on domain specific knowledge. 
• There are individual dilferences in the size of the universal age-related 
decrease in the extent to which one can acquire new cognitive skills. 
How the individual oppottunities and constraints on cognitive development are 
related is not yet clear. It is therefore necessary to plan combined longitudinal 
studies in which investigation of changes in cognitive skills in representative 
samples of different ages under natural conditions can be combined with 
specialized training programmes for selected subsamples with pattkular cogni-
tive characteristics. 
Differential stability of individual differences in the 
development of social traits and behaviour 
The development of social competence is closely related to, when not dependent 
upon, cognitive development, at least during childhood. However, social 
behaviour results not only from 'social intelligence' but also depends on 
motivationalandemotional processes and on social experience. The emergence 
of individual dilferences in social behaviour, the situational consistency and 
temporal stability of these differences, the continuity or discontinuity of changes 
in social behaviour, and the internal or external conditions governing develop-
mental patterns have been a preferred area for longitudinal studies. In the 
following description of some basic questions and results, we will rely heavily 
on the work of Jens Asendorpf. This work stems from the Munich Longitudi-
nal Study on the Genesis of Individual Campetendes (LOGIC) mentioned 
above. 
The following constructs were assessed in the LOGIC study of social 
development: 
Sociai competence This is a set of skills for interacting adequately and 
effectively with other people in the environment and an ability to inßuence the 
behaviour of another person so that it matches one's own interests. This 
construct was measured in the kindergatten group as weil as in dyadic play with 
familiar and unfamiliar peers. 
Sociai inhibition This is an individual disposition to react by inhibiting 
interactive behaviour in certain social situations. This construct was measured 
in the kindergatten group, in the school dass, and in a standardized laboratory 
situation. In addition, children's aggression in peer groups was both directly 
observed and was rated by the parents. 
PerJonaiity proftle This is as measured by the California Child Q Sott. 
It was measured each year on the basis of ratings by the preschoolfkindergatten 
teacher. In the discussion that follows, we will focus on some data concerning 
the development of social inhibition. 
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A central concem of most longitudinal studies, including those concerned 
with social inhibition, is the question of the temporal stability of individual 
differences. Many believe that a relatively high stability of individual differences 
despite age-related developmental changes means that long-term prediction of 
behaviour in the individual case is possible. 
Even when one overlooks this misconception, the scientific yield of the many 
studies on stability is disappointing. What Wohlwill wrote continues to be 
valid: 'With only very few exceptions, work on stability ... has consisted in the 
endless proliferation of correlation coefficients, to indicate the degree of 
relationship between measures of behavior obtained over some given time 
interval . . . The result has been that we have learned a little about the 
"behavior" of variables over age, but nothing concerning the behavior of 
individuals' (1973, pp. 358-359). 
A step-by-step description of Asendorpf's research prograrnme on social 
inhibition will illustrate how such pitfalls can be avoided. 
The first prerequisite for a developmental analysis is to clarify the theoretical 
constructs one wants to investigate and to specify their behavioural indices. For 
example, if social inhibition is defined as 'an emotional state that is characterized 
by inhibited approach motivation', it must be possible to differentiate this 
behavioural pattern from others such as unsociability or social avoidance. The 
emotional state indicating social inhibition is primarily manifestedas inhibition 
toward strangers and as inhibition in social-evaluative situations (Asendorpf, 
1989c, in press). 
The second pre-requisite for developmental analysis is an empirical test of 
whether the chosen behavioural indices tap the same construct at different ages. 
Asendorpf (1992) showed that there is a relatively perfect continuity across age 
in how shyness and social inhibition are expressed and are perceived. 
The third step is the investigation of the general developmental sequence of 
the trait. In the case of social inhibition, it is possible to discern three stages: 'In 
the first stage, inhibition towards adult strangers is aroused by rather simple 
physical characteristics of the Situation ... and social evaluative inhibition is 
restricted to conditioned cues for punishment of frustrative non-reward .... In 
the second stage, beginning araund the age of 20 months, the ernerging new 
ability of spontaneaus perspective taking arouses inhibitions towards peer and 
adult strangers due to a perceived uncertainty of the strangers' intentions, and 
social--evaluative inhibition due to the anticipation of negative or insufficiently 
positive social evaluations. Later on, in the third stage of the development of 
inhibition, the reflections about one's own self-presentation reaches awareness 
and becomes particularly intense during adolescence' (Asendorpf, in press). 
Inter-individual differences in inhibition toward strangers are very stable 
over time. This is based not only on a systematic review of the Iiterature 
(Asendorpf, 1989b, p. 79), but also on the results of the LOGIC study 
(Asendorpf, 1990a, 1993). The average, that is aggregated stability increases 
with increasing age from the second year of life on, and decreases only 
temporarily in adolescence. 
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Inhibition toward strangers is a personality trait that shows considerable 
situational and, as noted above, temporal consistency. This trait, however, 
loses its behavioural effect when situations and persons become more familiar, 
for example, in a kindergatten or school dass. Table 5.2 shows the relevant 
results for this point from the LOGIC study (Asendorpf, 1990b, p. 11; 
Asendorpf, 1993). 
Whereas the stability of individual differences in inhibition toward strangers 
remained stable across five measurement points, social inhibition in kindergat-
ten and school classes was less stable, and decreased continuously between 
measurement points. As the correlation pattem shows, the consistency between 
behaviour with strangers and behaviour with familiar classrnates also changed. 
In the first year of kindergarten and in the first year of grade school (when 
classmates were unfamiliar) there was a clear positive relation between inhibi-
tion toward strangers and inhibition toward classmates. However, in the third 
year of kindergatten and at the end of the second grade (when classmates were 
familiar), these correlations were no Ionger significant. 
The temporal stability ofindividual differences in a sample should be assessed 
not only at the aggregate Ievel, but individual social inhibition scores should 
also be used to assess differential stability, that is individual differences in 
stability (Asendorpf, 1989a). From a developmental perspective, data concem-
ing the stability of inter-individual differences in intra-individual change are 
especially interesting because they would make the identification of differential 
developmental pattems possible. Asendorpf (1992b) showed that the stability of 
children's peer network was positively related to the one-year stabilities of their 
inhibition toward peers (as judged by their parents) for three successive one-
year intervals. This finding demonstrates that the stability of individual 
characteristics can be profitably related to an individual's environmental 
stability. 
The steps of the research programme described thus far have all been 
variable-centred, that is, they have been focused on the variable 'social 
inhibition', not on the organization of the personality within which social 
inhibition is but one trait among many. To tap the impottant person-centred 
level, Asendorpf used a Q-sott profile procedure. The Q-sott profiles showed 
large inter-individual differences in temporal stability, producing individual 
stability coefficients that, in studies from Asendorpf and van Aken (1991 ), 
varied from - .09 to .83. 
How can one explain the large interindividual differences in the stability of 
personality pattems? A firstanswer to this question comes from the surprisingly 
strong correlations between a measure of two-year stability of the personality 
profile and a profile of the 'ideal child' provided by kindergatten teachers. In 
general, the more a child's profile approached that of the 'ideal child', the more 
stable was that child's profile over time (Asendorpf, 1990b). 
In a further analysis of data from the LOGIC project, it was possible to show 
that children with socially inhibited behaviour increasingly tended to prefer 
.75 .63 
~--
Strenger 1 Strenger 2 Strenger 3 
.68 I .58 .68 
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.69 
.47 .30 .23 .49 .01 
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.45 .14 
Table 5.2. Stabilities and consistencies of social inhibition towards strangers and classmates. (Data from Asendorpf, 1990a, p.ll .) 
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passive solo activities to social involvement. This finding suggests that an 
initially independent tendency to be socially inhibited becomes increasingly 
associated with uosociability on the overt behaviourallevel (Asendorpf, 1991 ). 
One should not interpret such patteras of relations and changes in the 
features of social behaviour in termsofasimple causal chain. For example, social 
inhibition is not the only determinant of social behaviour in the peer group. The 
social skills and the social status of an individual also play an important role. 
Asendorpf (1990a), for example, found that the social inhibition of children in a 
classroom became more pronounced when they were ignored by their peers or 
when their attempts at contact initiation were rejected. 
Future longitudinal sturlies will have to decide whether one is justified in 
speaking of children who are at risk for future social development in such cases. 
To be sure, Hymel et al. (1990) recently reported data that supported earlier 
findings (Kohlberg et al., 1972; Parker & Asher, 1987) that peer difficulties in 
early childhood are predictive of later maladjustmeot. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
lt would be completely inappropriate to try to undermine the current preference 
for cross-sectional designs with a new myth of longitudinal designs. The three 
examples we presented should have made it very clear that a better understand-
ing of development and individual dtlferences in cognitive, social and emotional 
areas does not arise simply from testing subjects longitudinally. Rather, 
longitudinal sturlies must fulfill certain theoretical criteria and methodological 
standards to avoid being simply a series of cross-sectional sturlies with repeated 
measures spread out over time. In saying that good longitudinal sturlies must 
meet certain criteria, we do not refer to the usual and obvious features of good 
empirical research, but rather to some particular specific requirements of 
longitudinal designs, that are best described here as Statements about the 
necessity of combining different research perspectives, not in a single study of 
course, but within a comprehensive research programme. 
Variable- and person-centred approaches should be combined. This allows 
two things: first, on the variable-centred Ievel, independent of the person as a 
structural entity, one can test psychologicallaws longitudinally; second, on the 
person-centred Ievel, one can test hypotheses about the development of the 
person as an organized pattem of variables or as an intentional actor and self-
reßective subject. The Swedish research project 'Individual development and 
adjustment' is a convincing and noteworthy example of the productivity of this 
research approach (Magnusson, 1988; Magnusson & Bergmao, 1990). 
Single-subject and large-scale designs should be combined. Using longitudi-
nal data to fully analyse quantitative and qualitative changes in developmental 
functions, and to study the stability of inter-individual differences in intra-
individual change is possible only when one combines the rnicro- and macro-
genetic Ievels. 
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The potential of longitudinal research for explaining change and stability has 
not been sufficiently exploited. Whereas longitudinal designs are preferred for 
describing continuity and discontinuity in developmental functions, changes in 
individual characteristics, the stability of individual differences, and variations 
of inter-individual differences in intra-individual changes, the few examples of 
research possibilities outlined in the discussion of social development should 
serve as a stimulant for exploring the potential oflongitudinal designs to further 
explain inter-individual differences in intra-individual change. 
Longitudinal studies should generally be theoretically grounded and should 
allow specific hypotheses tobe tested. However, longitudinal data also provide 
a source of hard-won data that may be used to uncover new or overlooked 
developmental phenomena and that may lead to the formulation of new 
theoretical ideas. Therefore, a combination of confirmatory and exploratory 
procedures in longitudinal studies should not only be an important criterion 
when planning single projects, but should become a dominant goal for all 
longitudinal research. 
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